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I have a crazy love of things. I like pliers and scissors. I love cups, rings, and bowls— 
Not to speak, of course, of hats. I love all things not just the grandest, also the infinitely 
small. . . . Many things conspired to tell me the whole story. Not only did they touch me,  
Or my hand touched them: They were so close that they were a part of my being, 
They were so alive with me that they lived half my life and will die half my death.2 
 
Pablo Naruda 
Common Things 
 
Like Pablo Neruda, Bruno Latour and Graham Harman have a philosophical 
affection for common things. Both take themselves to be materialists of a kind, 
though neither is sanguine about pursing a materialist program in which the 
world is reduced to atoms, corpuscles, electrons, quarks or other materia minima. 
Instead, Latour and Harman are materialists who are philosophically curious 
about the collections of common, material things that make up the world in 
which we live. Both are attentive to those things that analytic philosophers tend 
to call “middle-sized objects.” Although intuitively appealing, the mid-sized 
object has always been a philosophical conceit. It isn‟t clear what qualifies as 
mid-sized on the spectrum between the super-small (quarks, electrons, neutrinos 
and photons) and the super-large (take the star R136a1 which is 265 times larger 
than the Earth‟s sun). Philosophers at the beginning of the analytic tradition—
like Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein—explicitly included tables, chairs and 
hands in the class of mid-sized objects. This short list was, presumably, 
representative rather than exhaustive. In more recent analytic writing, the 
defining feature of a mid-sized object is that it can be picked out using unaided 
human sensory capacities. It isn‟t clear whether spectacles should count as 
sensory aids. If glasses are sensory aids, then what falls under the definition of 
mid-sized would seem to vary considerably from person to person. If glasses are 
                                                     
1 The thoughtful and helpful comments of Bryan Boddy and Daryn Lehoux are gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks to Noah Foster and Jessica Webb for their help, kindness and patience.  
2 Pablo Neruda, “Ode to Common Things,” in Ferris Cook, ed., Odes to Common Things, trans. 
Ken Krabbenhoft (New York: Bulfinch Press, 1994), 11-17. 
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not aids, then it isn‟t clear why the objects resolved by telescopes, microscopes 
and MRI should not qualify as mid-sized objects.3 Despite these unresolved 
questions the intuition that frames the concept of the mid-sized object is not 
optical resolution but that the mid-sized comprises those familiar objects 
encountered on a day-to-day basis in common human living. For Latour and 
Harman, if not for analytic philosophers, the list of mid-sized objects is a list of 
common things. It includes not just tables and chairs, but also Neruda‟s refulgent 
list: pliers, scissors, cups, rings, bowls, thimbles, nails, clocks and compasses. 
Given Harman‟s self-declared heterodox Heideggerianism, hammers should 
probably be added to that list. 
At least since Bertrand Russell‟s Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918), 
it has been one of the main tasks of philosophy to give an account of how tables 
and chairs are differentiated in the plenum of atoms (broadly conceived) that is 
the world. The puzzle of logical atomism may be thought of as an analogue of 
physical atomism: if the world is just a continuum of atoms then what makes the 
atoms of the table so obviously distinct from the floor and the surrounding air? In 
a world with some uniform and simple substrate, what if anything, gives nature 
its joints? Russell, circa 1918, gave a remarkably skeptical answer to these 
questions. Neither “Socrates” nor “Piccadilly” nor “The Twelfth Night” name 
particular existing things. For the early Russell, as for the early Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, “the world is the totality of facts, not of things.” Facts, not things, 
are. In contrast, Latour and Harman offer thing-philosophies. For Latour, if not 
Harman, it is things that bring facts into the world, not the other way around. 
Latour has sometimes identified his thing philosophy as “actor-network theory” 
(ANT), though he warns enigmatically, “there are four things that do not work 
with actor-network theory; the word “actor,” the word “network,” the word 
“theory” and the hyphen!”4 Less often, but I think more felicitously, Latour has 
called his work “a philosophy of techniques.”5 In The Prince of Networks (2009), 
Harman offers the first attempt at a comprehensive synthesis of Latour‟s oeuvre 
that reads Latour‟s actor-network theory as dovetailing with Harman‟s own 
“object-oriented philosophy” (OOP). As Harman says, “The world is a stage 
filled with actors; philosophy is object-oriented philosophy.”6 
Perhaps it is the case that Latour‟s philosophy of techniques can be 
profitably aligned with Harman‟s object-oriented philosophy. Perhaps ANT and 
OOP can help each other, even if it were to turn out that they can‟t be precisely 
fitted together. It is certainly the case that Latour and Harman share a deep 
                                                     
3 Grover Maxwell, “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities,” in Herbert Feigl and Grover 
Maxwell, eds., Scientific Explanation, Space and Time (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1962), 3-15. 
4 Bruno Latour, “On Recalling ANT,” in John Law and John Hassard, eds., Actor Network Theory 
and After (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1999, 2004), 15. 
5 Bruno Latour, “A Door Must Be Either Open or Shut: A Little Philosophy of Techniques,” in 
Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay, eds., Technology and the Politics of Knowledge 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 272-281. 
6 Graham Harman, The Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: Re.Press, 
2009), 16. 
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affection for things. Things have been enjoying something of a renaissance in 
cultural theory as well as philosophy of science. Bill Brown claims to be the 
architect of a new branch of critical theory called “thing theory.” Jane Bennett 
has produced what she calls a “political ecology of things.” Davis Baird develops 
an account of “thing knowledge” in which things, rather than propositions or 
statements, are bearers of justified true beliefs. Lorraine Daston has edited a 
volume of essays that offer biographies of scientific objects.7 However, none of 
this recent work figures in Harman‟s object-oriented philosophy. Even somewhat 
older resources about things receive nary a mention. Michel de Certeau‟s 
philosophy of the everyday gets only a passing glance. Nowhere to be found is 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton‟s oft-republished 
analysis of the relationship between domestic objects and the self.8 Given these 
available resources, why does Harman see Latour‟s philosophy as fitting so 
closely with object-oriented philosophy? Why Latour? Why no one else except 
perhaps Alfred N. Whitehead and Martin Heidegger? Harman is entirely open 
about his specific interest in Latour. His interest is purely metaphysical. Harman 
thinks that Latour‟s work is a veritable goldmine for any future metaphysics. 
“When the centaur of classical metaphysics is mated with the cheetah of actor-
network theory, their offspring is not some hellish monstrosity, but a 
thoroughbred colt able to carry us a century or more.”9 
Harman‟s object-oriented philosophy comes packaged with no light 
metaphysics. It is metaphysics in which objects are irresistible, unfathomable 
posits that are never fully revealed by their relations. The Prince of Networks 
emphasizes the features of Latour‟s account that re-enforce this account of 
objects. Yet, an unusual feature of Harman‟s discussion of Latour is that it 
proceeds as if Latour is already and always was contributing to a systematic 
philosophy. This is unusual because the locus of Latour‟s work is not 
metaphysics, and for the most part, it is not even philosophy of science. As we 
shall see in the third section of the paper, his major contributions have been to a 
comparatively new field of study called “Science and Technology Studies” 
(STS), which he openly describes as “a booming discipline short of discipline.” 
That discipline began as the study of physics, chemistry, biology, zoology, 
primatology and other natural sciences using approaches from history, 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology and economics. The field began by 
examining the production and dissemination of knowledge in the natural 
sciences, but as it matured it went on to study the interconnections between 
different areas of study. The discipline was characterized by the late Stephen 
                                                     
7 Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003). Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010). Lorraine Daston, ed., Biographies of Scientific Objects (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
8 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton, The Meaning of Things: Domestic 
Symbols and the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Michel de Certeau, The 
Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
9 Harman, Prince of Networks, 5. 
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Straker with the maxim, “studies studies studies studies.”10(It is left as an 
exercise for the reader to sort out the nouns, verbs and adjectives.) The field is, in 
Latour‟s view, short of discipline not because it lacks rigor, thoughtfulness or 
results, but in a fashion reminiscent of Pico della Mirandola, because it 
substitutes syncretism for specific disciplinary commitments. As Latour 
acknowledges, how this syncretism was to be understood was a major point of 
departure from Pierre Bourdieau‟s sociology and the Annales School‟s 
historicism and also, as we shall see in the following, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. 
In The Prince of Networks, Harman orients Latour towards philosophical 
metaphysics, even though Latour‟s main contributions have been to this strange 
new discipline called STS. Harman accomplishes this re-orientation not by 
arguing that Latour‟s position might be complemented by the metaphysics of 
object-oriented philosophy. Latour would almost certainly agree with that point. 
Rather, Harman makes the much stronger claim that Latour‟s work needs a 
metaphysics in order to be complete or coherent. Unsurprisingly, much depends 
on how the term “metaphysics” is understood. Consider for a moment E.A. 
Burtt‟s classic The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (1931). Burtt‟s 
metaphysics for modern science is “a world of atoms . . . equipped with none but 
mathematic characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in 
mathematical form.”11 While Burtt acknowledges the efficacy of this 
metaphysics, he also claimed that it overlooked “the big problems involved in the 
new doctrine of causality, and the inherent ambiguities in the tentative, 
compromising and rationally inconstruable form of the Cartesian dualism that 
had been dragged along like a tribal deity.”12 As Lorraine Daston has observed, 
Burtt‟s analysis of science embraces at least three different takes on its 
metaphysics. He rejects the teleology of Aristotelian metaphysics. He accepts the 
atomic metaphysics of mathematical physics. And, he adds the caveat that this 
modern physics includes a number of claims that are metaphysical by virtue of 
being unsupported by logic or experience.13 The simple lesson to be learned here 
is that the phrase “the metaphysics of science” can be invoked to signal the 
acceptance or rejection of a number of positions. As already noted, both Latour 
and Harman reject various forms of atomism, and they do so for reasons much 
like Burtt‟s. As we shall see in the first section of the paper, unlike Harman, 
Latour‟s solution is not to trade one metaphysics of fundamentals for another. He 
does not reject atomism in order to adopt the view that there are unfathomable 
                                                     
10 Stephen Straker (1942-2004) was a Canadian pioneer in the field of STS who worked in the 
history and philosophy of science and was the progenitor of the STS program at the University of 
British Columbia. The program initially bore his name, but its name has since been administratively 
reformed so that it is suitably aseptic. Straker‟s characterization of STS is reported by Katharine C. 
Wright, a former student of Straker. 
11 E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (New York: Dover Publications, 
1932, 2003), 303. 
12 Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, 301. 
13 Lorraine Daston, “History of Science in an Elegiac Mode: E.A. Burtt‟s Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science Revisited,” Isis 82 (1991): 522-531. 
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objects and manifest relations. Unlike Burtt, Latour resists the Machian impulse 
to declare as irrational anything not explicable strictly in terms of logic and 
experience. What is interesting, and I think unique, about Latour is that he retains 
elements of classical positivism without demanding the elimination of 
metaphysics. 
Harman has quipped that, “Latour is the only philosopher in history to 
have gone through his early and late phases simultaneously.”14 I think that this 
observation has the merit of being roughly correct as well as funny, though for 
different very reasons than Harman‟s. On the reading offered here, Latour‟s 
philosophy of techniques appeared in its mature form in his earliest book 
Laboratory Life (1979). His later work has been an effort to write a prolegomena 
to that early work. The hallmark of Latour‟s mature position is the claim that 
various specific techniques bring together things, comprised of human and non-
human objects, and make and justify the places in which we live and act. 
Techniques are best thought of as practices that bring things together into 
recognizable arrangements and simultaneously provide justification for those 
arrangements. The prolegomena for this mature position has taken so many 
books and papers to write because Latour is still struggling to develop an 
adequate neutral monist language that can give rich expression to the philosophy 
of techniques. To support this view of Latour, this paper proceeds in three 
sections. The first section draws mainly on a recent debate between Harman and 
Latour at the London School of Economics to show that Latour is surprisingly 
indifferent to Harman‟s argument that his position demands a metaphysics akin 
to that of object-oriented philosophy. The second section of the paper returns to 
Laboratory Life (1985) to reconstruct the features of that argument that I think 
are representative of Latour‟s mature position. The third section of the paper 
situates Latour‟s subsequent work in the context of disputes in Science and 
Technology Studies, particularly the arguments about “social construction.” I 
show why Latour rejected “social constructivism” in favor of simple 
“constructivism,” and argue that this rejection underscores the way in which 
Latour‟s techniques include standards of ratiocination as well as material 
manipulation and intervention. I maintain that, once this encompassing view of 
technique is adopted, Latour is committed not to a speculative metaphysics of 
hidden, underlying principles but an explicative or hermeneutic metaphysics that 
Latour calls, borrowing from Michel Serres, a pragmatogony. The combination 
of techniques and pragmatogonies, I suggest in the conclusion, leaves us with 
ontologies without metaphysics. 
 
Harmonices Mundis v.s. Ars Technica 
 
On 5 February 2008, Latour and Harman met at the London School of 
Economics to discuss Harman‟s book The Prince of Networks. The book offers a 
                                                     
14 Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, Peter Erdélyi, The Prince and the Wolf: Latour and Harman at 
the LSE (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011), 52. 
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detailed analysis of the philosophical upshot of Latour‟s actor-network theory. 
An edited version of the LSE discussion is published in a slender volume titled, 
The Prince and the Wolf (2011).The meeting between Latour and Harman is 
described as a “debate” but is probably better described as a continued 
discussion. The meeting was structured but informal, diverse topics were 
thoughtfully discussed, and the conversation was affable and good humored from 
beginning to end. Latour and Harman had met before, in Paris, Cairo, and 
Amsterdam. The LSE meeting seems to pick up where those conversations left 
off. The title of the discussion comes from a casual remark made by Latour: “I‟m 
like a dog following its prey, and the prey arrives in the middle of a band of 
wolves which are called professional philosophers . . . . My intention was not to 
fall in with wolves and to have to answer all of these guys while trying to catch 
my prey.”15 Latour is an accidental philosopher whose intellectual “home,” as he 
calls it, is in science studies.16 What Harman finds attractive about Latour (he 
offers no comment about any other contribution to science studies) is the 
emphasis on the “irreducible singularity” of things which Latour expresses in his 
so-called “principle of irreducibility.” That principle, sometimes simply called 
“irreduction,” asserts that: “Nothing [no thing] is, by itself, either reducible or 
irreducible to anything else.”17 Harman sees a natural fit between the principle of 
irreduction and his position that objects are “unified entities with specific 
qualities that are autonomous from us and from each other.” The aim of 
Harman‟s object-oriented philosophy is to ensure that, “things are granted a 
depth beyond any specific form—deeper than all flowers, coins, and wood.”18 
 While Latour and Harman agree that things have an irreducible 
singularity, past this point their positions rapidly diverge. What is evident in the 
remainder of the LSE debate is that Latour and Harman both love things but they 
disagree profoundly about metaphysics. They do not agree about its role, and 
they do not agree about its place in philosophy. The promptness of that 
divergence is possibly a consequence of vastly different influences. Harman 
counts Martin Heidegger among his principal influences, though he claims to 
offer a radical reading of Heidegger. Harman tells us that Heidegger‟s tool-
analysis is not “a theory of language and human praxis, nor a phenomenology of 
a small number of useful devices called „tools.‟” Instead, “Heidegger‟s account 
of equipment gives birth to an ontology of objects themselves.”19 Latour and 
Harman may have discussed Heidegger in private conversation but no part of that 
conversation appears in The Prince and the Wolf. The reasons for that might be 
that Latour almost never has anything good to say about Heidegger. He finds it 
                                                     
15 Latour, et al., Prince and Wolf, 41. Latour‟s “prey” is a comprehensive understanding of modern 
science along with an account of what it might be to have a comprehensive understanding. 
16 Ibid., 81. 
17 Bruno Latour, “Irreductions,” in The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John 
Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984, 1988), 158. 
18 Graham Harman, “On the Undermining of Objects,” in Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman, eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: Re.Press, 
2011), 22. 
19 Harman, “On the Undermining of Objects,” 22. 
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“baffling that people would take Heidegger‟s „philosophy of technology‟ 
seriously.”20 Heidegger‟s account of tools “has the somber and powerful appeal 
of all tales of decadence” but, in the end, it is “mistaken.” Latour‟s stance is that 
it is impossible to speak of “any sort of mastery in our relations with nonhumans, 
including their mastery over us.”21 
Despite Latour‟s explicit rejection of Heidegger, one of Harman‟s 
strategies for bringing Latour‟s philosophy closer to his own is to highlight the 
ways that Latour fits with his own heterodox Heideggerianism. In the Prince of 
Networks, Harman claims that, from the perspective of object-oriented 
philosophy, there are important similarities between Latour and Heidegger: 
 
Just as Latour teaches, there are countless actors of different sizes and 
types, constantly dueling and negotiating with each other. But objects are 
not defined by their relations: instead they are what enter into relations in 
the first place, and their allies can never fully mine their ores. In 
Heideggerian terms, objects enter relations but withdraw from them as 
well; objects are built of components but exceed those components. 
Things exist not in relation, but in a strange sort of vacuum from which 
they only partly emerge into relations.22 
 
To buttress the claim that OOP sits Janus-faced between Heidegger and 
Latour, Harman highlights the parallels between “the strange sort of vacuum” in 
which Heideggerian things exist and the concept of “plasma” that appears in 
Latour. Most STS commentators would probably not count “plasma” among the 
essential Latour-isms, if they had noticed the concept at all. The concept of 
plasma makes an appearance at the very end of Reassembling the Social (2005), 
Latour‟s excessively programmatic reappraisal of the social sciences. There we 
are instructed that plasma is “unformatted phenomena” that are “not yet 
measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metrological chains, and not yet 
covered, surveyed, mobilized or subjectified.”23 
Harman draws attention to plasma because it points to a couple of 
problems in Latour‟s argument. The first problem is that if Latour thinks there 
are wild, formless phenomena that have yet to be domesticated, then Latour 
should also think that there is “some reserve or reservoir” hidden away within 
things that is the well-spring of all that unformatted phenomena.24 What else 
could be the source of all that new and crazy phenomena? The second problem is 
that if Latour is claiming that phenomena are given their entire form by being 
studied, then this would imply that objects get their forms from relations, 
                                                     
20 Bruno Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” Isis 98 (2007), 140. 
21 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 176 and 211-203. 
22 Harman, Prince of Networks, 132. 
23 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 244. 
24 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 244. Latour, cited in Harman, Prince of Networks, 133. 
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specifically, the relation of being an object of study. That would mean that 
Latour isn‟t a true thing philosopher after all, because things are inextricably 
entwined with their relations, rather than being fully-fledged, self-sufficient 
objects. The force of Harman‟s comments on plasma is that, on pain of self-
contradiction, Latour must have a metaphysics, despite any apparent protestations 
to the contrary.25 Harman‟s hope is that object-oriented philosophy provides 
Latour with all the metaphysics he needs. The position of OOP is that 
metaphysics gives us a view of the “furniture of the universe” but that it cannot 
do so “absolutely and in final form.” The reason that metaphysics can give us no 
final picture is that the universe‟s furniture, things or objects, have many qualities 
or properties that are not manifest. Things do take up relations with people and 
other things, but they also have a kind of inner essence that is fully actualized 
(and not merely potential) but never fully revealed. Harman denies that this 
position is not foundational, since that would imply “some sort of enduring 
foundation that you‟re going build everything on.”26 Foundations, if they even 
exist, are elusive since the world is never fully revealed. How then is the 
metaphysician to proceed? Harman proposes that reality, not foundations, is the 
proper goal of metaphysics, and reality consists of things. The wrinkle in that 
straightforward approach is that the reality of things is unknown because things 
are never fully known by what we glean by observing their relations. That‟s an 
insuperable problem, Harman concedes, but nevertheless, reality must be there 
since there must be something doing the relating that we observe. Latour offers a 
playful précis of Harman‟s metaphysics: “It‟s because things are beyond relations 
that they have relations.” Harman expresses no dissatisfaction with this 
characterization.27 
There is much that Latour likes about Harman‟s description of his 
philosophy, notably the characterization of his position as the first and, as yet, 
only “secular occasionalism.”28 That acknowledged, Latour is deeply resistant to 
the claim that a specific metaphysics is indispensible to his position. In the course 
of the discussion at the LSE, he does not flinch when an interlocutor suggests 
that he has an ontology, but on the question of his metaphysics, he only 
comments that, “if metaphysics is interesting, it is as a method: as travel, as a 
way of getting new insights.”29 In response to Harman‟s criticisms, Latour 
politely avoids mentioning that in Reassembling the Social he did not claim that 
plasma was unformatted, but only that plasma had no social form. Given 
Latour‟s position, which we shall further develop in the next two sections of this 
paper, it is perfectly plausible that plasma has form without having any specified 
social form or, for that matter, specified material form. Further, while Harman 
interprets plasma to be some kind of unformed world of goo, Latour conceives 
plasma in smaller more local terms. He tells us that plasma is “what allows for 
                                                     
25 Harman, Prince of Networks, 134. Latour, et al., Prince and Wolf, 61. 
26 Latour et al., Prince and Wolf, 57 and 68. 
27 Ibid., 62. 
28 Harman, Prince of Networks, 159 and 228. Latour, et al., Prince and Wolf, 112. 
29 Latour, et al., Prince and Wolf, 89 and 59. 
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the sustenance of a very small pocket of existence in which we are.”30 Latour‟s 
concern is not to explain existence into (whatever that might involve). His project 
is to explain how the small pockets of existence are sometimes reconfigured or 
transformed into new modes of existence. For example: how is it that things 
called ferments were once unequivocally caused by spontaneous generation but 
now precisely the same things are just as unequivocally caused by germs? How 
did the same object trade one property for another, completely incompatible, 
property? Or, to foreshadow the example of the next section, how is it that 
“souls” were re-written as “brains” and, in the process, how did the seat of the 
soul move from the pineal gland to the hypothalamus? 
Given that Latour and Harman have very different philosophical projects, 
I suspect that Latour‟s interest in object-oriented philosophy probably does not 
stem from a concern that it provides a metaphysics that ANT lacks but needs. 
Instead, his interest is that OOP is a thing-philosophy that faces some of the same 
quandaries as ANT, another thing-philosophy. That might be an uncharitable 
reading (I do not intend it to be), but it explains why Latour tackles Harman‟s 
criticisms of plasma indirectly. Latour‟s reply, such as it is, is to entangle OOP in 
precisely the same problem that Harman identifies for ANT. Latour points out 
that if objects themselves are “beyond all relations,” then all we have to go on to 
understand them is their relations. As he says, “it‟s because things are irreducible 
that the relations have now center stage.”31 Latour does not deny that things have 
properties that are not manifest, and might never be manifest, but he is just 
enough of a positivist to ask: if a thing is completely unrelated to us, if it does not 
manifest itself in some way, then how we even know that it is a thing? Things 
may have cryptic, hidden qualities nestled in the core of their being, but we only 
come to know the way things are by way of relations. Now, Harman finds this 
question muddled since it asks a question that is simultaneously about 
epistemology and metaphysics. Harman declares himself to be a “traditional” 
philosopher insofar as he thinks that metaphysical issues are “separate” from 
epistemological issues. Latour does not entertain this traditional distinction 
between metaphysics and epistemology, or ontology and epistemology. 
Questions about how scientists know objects via acquaintance with some but not 
all their properties are an indispensable part of Latour‟s work. Latour does agree 
with Harman this far: scientific acquaintance with an object does not involve 
discovering its nature or essence. Even if there are such things as essences, it is 
not clear that scientific methods make them manifest. With access to the inner 
nature of objects barred, Latour answers his question about the relationship 
between knowledge and objects by developing a detailed account of the 
techniques that connect statements with things. 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Ibid., 63. 
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Laboratory Life 
 
In early October 1975, Latour joined Roger Guillemin‟s laboratory at the Salk 
Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego California as a participant-observer. 
We might now think of him as an embedded anthropologist. Latour‟s co-author, 
Steve Woolgar, described Latour‟s condition in 1975 as follows: “His knowledge 
of science was non-existent; his mastery of English was very poor; and he was 
completely unaware of the existence of the social studies of science . . . he was 
thus in the classic position of the ethnographer sent to a completely foreign 
environment.”32 Woolgar overstates the situation to give the impression that 
Latour was a kind of tabula rasa, on an anthropological expedition to squat in the 
mud-huts of science. It is not clear what it might mean to have knowledge of 
“science.”(How much does a specialist in, say, cladistics know about quantum 
gravity anyway?) Latour‟s English probably wasn‟t all that bad, compared with, 
say, my French. And, there is a good reason that the young Latour may have been 
unaware of Anglo-American STS. The major works in the field had yet to be 
published. David Bloor‟s Knowledge and Social Imagery would not appear until 
the following year. This does not mean that Latour was without influential 
companions when he entered Guillemin‟s lab; Gaston Bachelard, Michel Serres, 
Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and Pierre Bordieu all went 
into the lab with him. Of course, it was dumb luck, plain and simple, that the 
science Latour was studying would win a Nobel prize just two years later. What 
Latour was studying was not defective or maverick science but exemplary 
science in action. 
In 1977, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to 
Roger Guillemin, Andrew V. Schally and Rosalyn Yalow. The recipients had all 
contributed to tracing the chemical function of hormones in the blood. Hormones 
are difficult to work with since many of them appear in the blood and tissues in 
trace quantities that are below the detection threshold of conventional chemical 
assays. Yalow developed techniques for detecting hormones in blood at 
concentrations of one thousand billionths of a gram per milliliter of blood. She 
received the Nobel prize for further work, alongside Berson, that demonstrated 
that minute quantities of some protein hormones could stimulate the production 
of antibodies, and (as if that were not enough) for developing a general method 
of using antibodies to measure the concentrations of antigens (like hormone 
levels in the blood). This technique is sometimes called the Yalow-Berson 
method or radioimmunoassay (RIA). Berson died in 1972 and Nobels are only 
bestowed upon the living, so Yalow was the sole recipient of half the prize. The 
other half was awarded to Guillemin and Schally who, unlike the co-operative 
duo Yalow and Berson, led competing (and sometimes antagonistic) teams of 
laboratory scientists who happened to reach the same goal at about the same 
time. They jointly received half the prize for being, “the first to isolate several of 
                                                     
32 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts 
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the communicating chemical links between the brain and the pituitary, and they 
also determined their structure and succeeded in synthesizing them.” Rolf Luft, 
the cell-physiologist who was then Chair of the Nobel Committee for Physiology 
or Medicine, described Guillemin and Schally‟s work as the discovery of “a 
substantial part of the link between body and soul” and “part of the link between 
the body (soma) and the soul (brain).”33 What had been discovered that warranted 
such an enigmatic, if not outrageous, description? 
 Descartes speculated that the pineal gland was the seat of the soul, but 
arguably the late-modern soul is seated in the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus 
is an almond-sized gland that sits at the base of the forebrain of vertebrates just 
above the brain stem. The hypothalamus is unique because it receives stimuli via 
nerve connections from the nervous system, and it responds to those stimuli by 
releasing hormones that change the behavior of other glands and organs. In other 
words, the hypothalamus is the bridge between the electrical signaling system of 
the central nervous system and the chemical signaling system of the endocrine 
system. The hypothalamus is responsible for a variety of bodily functions—
including those that maintain homeostasis, like heart rate, temperature and fluid 
balance—but it exerts most of its hormonal controls by proxy through the 
pituitary gland, a pea-sized gland that protrudes from the bottom of the 
hypothalamus. Which hormones are released by the pituitary, and in what 
concentration they are released, is controlled by hormones secreted from the 
hypothalamus directly into the pituitary via the hypophy seal portal system, small 
ducts running from the hypothalamus directly into the anterior pituitary. The 
pituitary is commonly understood to control growth and development, but it also 
controls a number of hormones that regulate a variety of bodily functions, among 
them adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), antidiuretic hormone (ADH), 
follicle stimulating hormone (FSH), and thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH). As 
Schally reports, the hypothalamus-pituitary relationship was a matter of 
conjecture when he began his work in 1954. “Despite a strong circumstantial 
case favoring hypothalamic control of the pituitary, the proposition would remain 
speculative until direct evidence for the existence of specific hypothalamic 
chemotransmitters controlling release of pituitary hormones could be 
demonstrated.”34 
A significant project completed by Guillemin and Schally in the late 
1960s and early 1970s was to isolate and identify the structure of the molecule by 
which the hypothalamus signaled the pituitary gland to release a further molecule 
called thyrotropin that controlled the functions of the thyroid gland. The 
molecule by which the hypothalamus signaled the pituitary gland to release 
thyrotropinis called, perhaps unsurprisingly, Thyrotropin Releasing Hormone 
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(TRH). TRH was Schally‟s usual name for the hormone; Guillemen generally 
just called it Thyrotropin Releasing Factor (TRF). Together the hypothalamus 
and pituitary control not only autonomic and endocrine functions; they are also 
involved in the physical expression of emotions. As Loft observed in his Nobel 
address, “When American soldiers were sent to the European war scene, 
thousands of female companions who were left behind stopped menstruation. 
They were completely healthy, but the emotional stress had an influence on 
certain body functions, causing these functions to cease.”35 In addition to stress, 
shivering, fight-or-flight reactions and a number of other psycho-physical 
reactions are all hypothalamic responses to stimuli from the central nervous 
system. It was in just this sense that Guillemin and Schally were said to have 
discovered the link between body and soul, between bodily function and brain-
nerve stimulus. Even if a distinction were to be drawn between mind and brain, 
after their work it was possible to trace the neuro chemical relations by which the 
mind ultimately affected the body. And, of course, this tracing project had not 
been completed holus bolus, since only a few brain-body linkages had been 
examined in detail. 
As Guillemin put it in his Nobel lecture, “The isolation and 
characterization of TRF was the result of an enormous effort. . . . It was of such 
heuristic significance, that I can say that neuroendocrinology became an 
established science on that event.”36 Two features of Guillermin‟s statement are 
worth highlighting. First, the discovery of TRH (along with the RIA technique) 
marked the establishment of a new research program in the emerging area of 
neuroscience, specifically neuroendocrinology. That research program would 
involve tracing the brain-body neurochemical messaging system in increasing 
detail. Thus, the isolation and identification of TRH not only showed how 
psychological states in the brain could affect the body (and vice versa), it was 
what Thomas Kuhn might have called an “exemplar” and Imre Lakatos would 
have called “a positive research program.” TRH was a concrete result that 
promised further fruitful research that would lead to the production of new and 
novel facts. Second—and this is the feature of the event with which Latour 
grapples—he declares that the discovery of TRH was a heuristic event. The basic 
point here is that the techniques and practices developed in the identification of 
TRH would serve as an effective means of furthering the research program. This 
approach to research would seem to be good sense, but accepting that alone is not 
also sufficient reason to think that heuristics are truth-apt. Recall Edgar Zilsel‟s 
poignant observation that “even vague and dubious assertions can render good 
services to empirical research as a heuristic stimulus.”37 
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When Latour entered Guillemin‟s laboratory in 1975, most of the work 
on TRH was complete. His anthropological stance was, at least in some part, 
feigned. It was a device that allowed him to answer the question, “How was the 
fact of TRH established?” without framing the answer in terms of another 
philosophical account of the scientific method. For Latour, what was striking 
about the lab work being done at the Salk Institute was how an object of 
knowledge and study, like TRH, was at once a number of statements that could 
be published in a journal and, simultaneously, a thing in the world. Lab talk and 
lab work seemed to move seamlessly between language and the world, as if there 
were no representational issues to be overcome. Before 1966-ish, TRH or TRF 
(take your pick) was a vague placeholder—it was some (we know not yet what) 
factor or hormone that (if it exists) is the chemical by which the hypothalamus 
causes the pituitary to release thyrotropin. After about 1966, TRH became an 
opaque something or other; it was not even clear that it was a peptide, and it 
might have turned into a chimerical artefact.38 If science proceeded according to 
philosophical ideals, then Guillemen and Schally would have proceeded by 
confirming or falsifying hypotheses about TRH. Perhaps science does proceed in 
just this fashion, if viewed from a distance through a philosophical lens. But, 
from Latour‟s close-up anthropological stance, describing science in this way is a 
little like reading Tolstoy‟s War and Peace and then describing it as being about 
Russia.39 On Latour‟s richer account, a laboratory does not perform a single 
operation on statements, like confirming or falsifying, rather “a laboratory is 
constantly performing operations on statements; adding modalities, citing, 
enhancing, diminishing, borrowing, and proposing new combinations.”40 While 
labs transform statements, they do so in specific relationships with things and 
techniques. 
As a thing in the world, TRH, like other hormones, occurs in very scant 
quantities. Any single hypothalamus only contains about 20 nanograms of the 
stuff. By 1966, Schally‟s researchers extracted a whopping 2.8 milligrams of 
TRH from roughly 100,000 porcinehypothalami, and by 1968, Guillemin‟s lab 
isolated a comparatively modest 1 milligram of TRH from about 300,000 
ovinehypothalami. From the birds-eye view of a pseudo-anthropologist, the Salk 
Lab appeared to be a sophisticated abattoir—a production line that gobbled up 
pig brains and used a variety of resources to transform the brains into articles in 
science journals. This view of the lab annoys Davis Baird so much that he bluntly 
describes it as a “travesty.”41 However, the point of this caricature of the lab was 
not reductio ad absurdum. Following Bachelard‟s Le matérialism rationnel 
(1953), Latour was pointing out that TRH could not be said to exist, much less 
identified, without the purification techniques that separated it from the tons of 
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pig and sheep brains and the bioassay techniques that began to approximate its 
structure.“A fraction only exists by virtue of the process of discrimination.”42 The 
“phenomenon-techniques” (to use Bachelard‟s phrase) that discriminate TRH are 
the processes used for its isolation (Sephadex gel filtration, phenol extraction, 
CMC chromatography and free-flow electrophoresis) and the processes used for 
its approximate identification (a variety of spectroscopic techniques, including 
infrared, ultraviolet and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy). TRH 
is inseparable from these techniques of isolation and identification that make it 
manifest. Its reality, its presence in the world as TRH, depends on those 
techniques. Without these techniques, TRH is, like pixie dust and Cartesian 
vortices, pure speculation. As Latour puts it, “the solidity of this object, which 
prevented it from becoming subjective or artefactual, was constituted by steady 
accumulation of techniques.”43 
A crucial part of the TRH story is that 2.8 mg of TRH was too small a 
quantity with which to identify the precise structure of TRH by the analytical 
techniques available in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Information about TRH 
could be gleaned from NMR spectra but the minute quantities of material 
available meant that this technique was stretched to its detection threshold, and as 
a result, the information obtained was unspecific. (This issue among others 
prompted the National Institute of Science [NIS], concerned about the project‟s 
prospects of success, to begin a review of its funding for the research.) Prior to 
1968, NMR and enzyme analysis had produced thoroughly ambiguous results: 
TRH may or may not be a polypeptide; if it were a polypeptide it might be a 
simple polypeptide; or it might not be a peptide at all. If the structure of TRH 
were to be positively identified, then it entailed a new strategy for identification 
or returning to the tedious, time-consuming process of mashing chunks of pig 
brain. As Schally remarked in an interview with Latour: “The key factor is not 
the money, it‟s the will . . . the brutal force of putting in 60 hours a week for a 
year to get one million fragments.”44 Faced with this gut-wrenching task, 
naturally a decision was made to pursue a new strategy. As Guillemin quietly put 
it, “the characterization of the molecular structure of TRF was achieved in an 
unconventional manner.”45 
The new and unorthodox strategy was to synthesize a compound with a 
known structure that had all the same biological properties as the TRH extracted 
from hypothalami. If the synthetic molecule was indistinguishable from 
hypothalamic TRH, then it could be said that hypothalamic TRH had the same 
structure as the synthetic compound. Of course, this strategy is not 
unproblematic—criteria of indistinguishability must be supplied. Biological 
activity alone might not be enough since it is possible that another compound 
could behave in many of the same ways as TRH but not be precisely TRH. 
Structural analysis was hampered by the shortage of TRH. Chromatographic 
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analysis of both TRH and the synthetic molecule suggested they were identical, 
though the Schally team that conducted analysis thought this result to be more 
conclusive than the Guillemin team did. The Guillemin team thought that only a 
mass spectrograph analysis would be conclusive. Mass spectroscopy requires the 
sample to be volatilized in analysis, and both TRH and the synthetic molecule 
were resistant to volatilization. Sometime in September 1969, Roger Burgus 
developed a new technique to volatilize TRH and completed a mass 
spectroscopic analysis of TRH and the synthetic molecule. A spectrum was 
obtained “that no one in the field could interpret as being significantly different 
from that for the synthetic material.”46 The structure of TRH had been 
discovered. 
Later, Burgus and Guillemen commented that, “this is the first instance 
of the structure of natural product being determined on the basis of its similarity 
with a synthetic material.” This unconventional strategy was the new heuristic 
that Guillemin mentioned in his Nobel lecture. An inferential precedent had been 
set and a new standard of acceptable argumentation had been established. The 
Cartesian might scruple—hats and coats might cover automatic machines rather 
than men—but here the criterion invoked owes more to Lavoisier than Descartes. 
Lavoisier, exasperated with philosophical pieties, declared an element not to be 
“simple, indivisible atoms of which matter is composed” but instead “the last 
point which analysis is capable of reaching.”47 For a moment Latour adopts 
Bachelard‟s voice and points out, “Aristotle defined a substance as something 
more than its attribute. In chemistry, however, a substance can be so completely 
reduced to its attribute that an exactly similar substance can be obtained de 
novo.” Latour continues, apparently following Bachelard: “If the exact structure 
[of TRH] could be obtained, some of the solidity of chemistry and molecular 
biology could be injected into endocrinology.”48 Guillemin may have been 
expressing just this kind of sensibility when he stated that the discovery of TRH 
made neuroendocrinology an established science. Although Latour seems to 
acknowledge that in chemistry and physics an object can be reduced to little 
more than its attributes, his argument does not rest with either Bachelard or 
Guillemin. Latour is not quite so reductionist. 
With Lavoisier, Latour‟s claim is that TRH was not discovered by 
reducing it to its metaphysical substrate, but by its position at the last point that 
analysis is capable of reaching. The structure of TRH was discovered by building 
up analytical techniques and aligning those techniques with assertions about 
TRH. For Latour, the discovery of TRH was not the discovery of a fact or the 
truth of the statement “TRH is tropic tripeptide hormone with the structure 
pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2.” For Latour, the discovery of TRH is the construction of 
the practices and techniques that link the statement “TRH is a tropic tripeptide 
                                                     
46 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 149. 
47 Antoine Lavoisier, Elements of Chemistry, trans. Robert Kerr (New York: Dover Publications, 
1965), xxiv. 
48 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 143. The reference here is to Bachelard‟s Le nouvel esprit 
scientifique (1934). 
16 
 
hormone with the structure pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2” all the way back to pig 
hypothalami. Scientific facts are thus constituted by the laboratory work that ties 
statements in journal articles and textbooks back to their material basis among 
things in the world. What makes TRH a fortuitous anthropological study for 
Latour is not that it was research that contributed to Guillemin and Schally 
sharing a Nobel. Rather, discovery of TRH involved the invention and adoption 
of a new laboratory practice of identification that itself entrenched a ratiocinative 
standard of identity as an explicit standard of disciplinary practice. According to 
that new disciplinary standard, if it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck and is 
indistinguishable from a duck by all available technique, then it is a duck. From 
this point on, at least in neuroendrinology, Cartesian worries about Vaucanson‟s 
duck have no rational standing. 
 
The Epiphenomena of Techniques 
 
When the second edition of Laboratory Life was published in 1985, it came with 
a new subtitle. In the intervening six years, some of the major contributions to 
STS had reached maturity and had begun to appear in book form, notably Harry 
Collins‟ Changing Order (1983), Andrew Pickering‟s Constructing Quarks 
(1984), and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer‟s Leviathan and the Air-Pump 
(1985).(Shapin and Shaffer would later receive the prestigious Erasmus prize for 
this book.) Another three years would see the publication of Steve Fuller‟s Social 
Epistemology (1988) and The Social Construction of Technological Systems 
(1987) edited by Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes and Trevor Pinch. The 
intervening six years had been sufficient time to bring methodological 
distinctions between different camps of STS into sharper relief. By 1985, Latour 
(perhaps more than Woolgar) was concerned to distance himself from both the 
Edinburgh “strong program” in the sociology of science (organized mainly 
around the work of David Bloor, Barry Barnes and John Henry) and the Bath 
school of the sociology of science (organized mainly around the work of Harry 
Collins and Trevor Pinch). Notably what was struck from the sub-title of 
Laboratory Life was a single word, “social.” The 1979 edition of Lab Life was 
subtitled, “The Social Construction of Scientific Facts,” whereas the 1985 edition 
of Lab Life was called “The Construction of Scientific Facts.” The preface to the 
second edition warned that, “readers tempted to conclude that the main body of 
the text replicates that of the original are advised to consult Borges,” an allusion 
to Jorge Luis Borges tale of “Pierre Menard, author of The Quixote.”49 
Prompting the apparently negligible change of title was a major 
disagreement among STSers. In 1976, David Bloor boldly claimed that the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) would explain the “very content and 
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nature of scientific knowledge.”50 Science studiers from the Edinburgh and Bath 
schools of SSK were in general agreement that the entire content of science could 
be given a sociological explanation. Their argument for this position, in rough 
outline, had two parts. First, they argued that facts and reasons are always 
ambiguous. Second, they claimed that since there were no unambiguous facts and 
reasons it followed that scientific theories, methods and acceptable results are 
social conventions. A few nanoseconds after this relativist big-bang,51 science 
studiers realized that these principles were just as applicable to the work of 
sociologists of science as they were to scientists. A roiling debate surfaced about 
how to cope with this issue of “reflexivity.” Edinburgh school sociologists 
reveled in the narcissistic delights of self-study, while Bath school sociologists 
took flight to a fully-fledged relativism.52 In Lab Life, Latour and Woolgar had 
been part of the chorus of the sociology of scientific knowledge. For example, 
they were willing to assert, “sociologists of knowledge have convincingly argued 
the case for the social fabrication of science.”53 But, by 1985, Latour if not 
Woolgar had begun to re-appraise his position. By striking the word “social” 
from the title of Lab Life, Latour distanced himself the claim that “social” 
accounts of the content of scientific knowledge had any unique explanatory 
efficacy. As Latour later expressed his reservation: “„Society‟ has to be 
composed, made up, constructed, established, maintained and assembled. It is no 
longer to be taken as the hidden source of causality which could be mobilized so 
as to account for the existence and stability of some other action or behavior.”54 
Although the world “social” was struck from the title, Latour retained 
and continues to use the term “construction.” Outside STS, from the standpoint 
of Anglo-American philosophy, talk of the “construction of facts” was no less 
alarming than talk of “the social construction of facts.”55 Talk about the 
“construction of facts” or the “social construction of facts” is often surrounded by 
an aura of dramatic unmasking. Facts, which appear to be inevitable and 
objective, are unmasked and shown to be the contingent outcome of capital, 
gender, power or consensus among relevant elites.56 It is a plot-line much like an 
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episode of Scooby-Doo. The specific kind of social constructivism peddled in 
SSK rankles analytic philosophers and many scientists not simply because it 
unmasks some scientific facts as constructions. That kind of weeding work could 
be thought of as a useful social or intellectual service. The sticking point is that 
SSK takes as a methodological precept the principle that all scientific facts great 
and small can be unmasked and shown to be the outcome of contingent historical 
circumstances and negotiation among scientists, not an outcome of the logical 
evaluation of evidence. The stance Latour developed around 1985, and 
retroactively super-imposed on Lab Life, is radically different from the usual 
SSK position—it denies that either “nature” or “society” by themselves can be 
the explicans of facts. Latour‟s modified stance continues to deny the view that 
facts are primitive, and so it still departs from the Russell-Wittgenstein position 
that the world consists of facts, not things. The modified position continues to 
maintain that facts are “constructed” or “fabricated” by the practices and 
techniques that produce and maintain the relationship between statements and 
features of the actual world. 
What exactly does it mean to say that facts are constructed or fabricated 
by the practices and techniques that make and maintain a relationship between 
statements and things? Let‟s try to answer this question by returning to the case 
of TRH. On Latour‟s account, TRH is not a mysterious, hidden fact or mystery 
that was uncovered or revealed by Guillemin and Schally. Rather, the fact of 
TRH is made and maintained by specific laboratory practices and techniques. 
There is nothing mysterious about these practices, and they can be instantiated 
anywhere; the same “peptide structure discovered in California works in the 
smallest hospital in Saudi Arabia.”57 When Latour asserts that TRH works in any 
place with sufficient technical capacity, he is again appealing to the justificatory 
force of technique. The statement “TRH is a tropic tripeptide hormone with the 
structure pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2” is a fact because that statement can be linked 
through traceable, reproducible steps of laboratory technique and inferential 
practices back to the hypothalami of pigs, sheeps, cows, rats and other 
vertebrates. For Latour, facts are the complete spectrum of techniques that align 
statements and things. The fact of TRH is constituted by: the extraction of 
secretions from hypothalami; the refinement of that extract by gel filtration, 
phenol extraction and so forth; its approximate identification by spectroscopy; 
the synthesis of a molecule isomorphic to the extracted TRH; the mass 
spectroscopic analysis of the extracted and synthetic TRH (along with a new 
means for its volatilization); and, last but not least, the ratiocinative principle that 
behaviorally indistinguishable molecules have the same structure. At one end of 
this spectrum of techniques are meaty, fleshy objects—100,000 or more 
vertebrate hypothalami. At the other end of the spectrum is the statement in an 
article or textbook: “TRH is tropic tripeptide hormone with the structure 
pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2.” For Latour, the fact is the whole spectrum of linkages 
between hypothalami and the statement. In modern laboratory science, the facts 
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of the matter are constituted or constructed by the linkages created by practice 
and technique that hook up things in the world with statements. 
In Lab Life and Science in Action (1987), Latour is noticeably obsessed 
with “inscription machines.” The purpose of almost every laboratory device and 
practice is to transform material things into a form that could be published in a 
journal article. Detractors from the Bath school of SSK sardonically commented 
that in Latour‟s hands science had become “just writing.”58 Ian Hacking 
remarked more charitably that Latour‟s youthful fixation on writing was “a 
bracing reminder of that glorious Parisian world of long ago, the late sixties, 
when inscriptions were the reality and text was substance.”59 In Latour‟s later 
work, the emphasis on the production of inscriptions all but vanishes. In its place 
appears a new emphasis on “mediation.” Also in the later work, the terms 
“construction” and “fabrication” fade from view and the term “constitution” is 
used with much greater frequency. At first glance, that seems like a mighty shift 
in position, but for the most part, Latour‟s later views bear an eerie resemblance 
to his early analysis of TRH research in the Salk laboratory. Retained is the 
important idea that facts are not unified, singular posits but traceable linkages 
between statements and things. New is a much more refined account of the 
linkages that constitute facts. In Lab Life, laboratory techniques winnow away 
things in the world, gradually replacing features of the thing with inscriptions 
about the thing. This leaves open a potential misreading of Latour‟s position that 
takes “things” to be natural and statements to be “social” and so misconstrues 
facts as bridges between the natural and the social.60 Later work diminishes the 
possibility of such a misreading by making both “nature” and “society” 
themselves epiphenomena of technique. 
As shown in the previous section, Lab Life invoked Bachelard‟s phrase 
“phenomenon-techniques” as a means of explaining how laboratory techniques 
produce a phenomenon. Latour extends this position by claiming that the 
isolation and identification of an entity is only possible given such techniques, 
and so it is perfectly reasonable to say that the entity only exists by virtue of 
these techniques‟s processes of discrimination. For the early Latour, “it is not 
simply that phenomena depend on certain material instrumentation; rather the 
phenomena are thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the 
laboratory.”61 Phenomena-techniques reappear in Latour‟s later work. For 
example, in the essay “Circulating Reference” (1999), he tells us: “Phenomena . . 
. are not found at the meeting point between things and the forms of the human 
mind; phenomena are what circulates all along the reversible chain of 
transformations, at each step losing some properties to gain others that render 
                                                     
58 Collins and Yearley, “Epistemological Chicken,” 379-380.  
59 Hacking, “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences,” 35. 
60 Just such a misreading aligns Latour with the sociology of knowledge. For the most part, STSers 
do not engage in this misreading and recognize that Latour has almost no sympathy with SSK. See, 
for example, David Bloor, “Anti-Latour,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 30 
(1999): 81-112. 
61 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 64. 
20 
 
them compatible with already-established centers of calculation.”62 This is 
certainly reminiscent of the old Latour. But, in the old Latour every 
phenomenon-technique was an “inscription machine” that, to some extent, de-
materialized things and transformed them into statements. The work of technique 
was to convert natural things into social text. But, for the new Latour, both 
“nature” and “society” are themselves “constituted” by phenomena-techniques, 
so it is now verboten to given an account of the work of techniques as converting 
things into text or, more generally, nature into society. Again—and this point 
cannot be stressed strongly enough—for Latour, the division of phenomena into 
the categories of “the natural” and “the social” cannot be taken for granted. Any 
fundamental analysis must show how nature and society, as well as other 
problematic categories—like person and thing, soul and body—are an outcome 
of other kinds of processes.  
Latour‟s unique form of hyperbolic doubt about the categories of 
analysis has, like so many of his ideas, its distant roots in Lab Life. In Lab Life a 
distinction was often drawn between that which is known by a strictly logical 
method or “demonstration” and that which is known by some other kind of 
persuasive strategy or “rhetoric.”63 Against those who maintain that science 
ought to proceed logically, Latour replies that there is, “an essential contradiction 
between the use by scientists of procedures which are logical (but sterile) and yet 
fruitful (but logically incorrect).”64As the case of TRH shows, scientists had no 
qualms about creating an altogether new ratiocinative standard according to 
which a hormone may be said to have an identical structure with a synthetic 
molecule that exhibits all the same relevant causal behaviors. That new standard 
is not irrational by any stretch of the imagination, and it certainly was fruitful, but 
it also isn‟t textbook deductive, demonstrative logic at work. Even in Lab Life, 
Latour was beginning to push this point to its rational terminus: “The list of 
possible alternatives by which we can evaluate the logic of a deduction is 
sociologically (rather than logically) determined.”65 The late Latour might accept 
the upshot of this claim—that there are always decisions to be made about which 
practices to accept as constitutive of rational explanation—with the additional 
proviso that these decisions cannot be adequately explained “sociologically” 
because “the social” itself is an outcome of decisions about canons of rationality. 
By the same argument, decisions about canons of rational explanation cannot be 
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explained by appeals to “nature” since nature is also an outcome of decisions 
about which methods of study are rational.66 
Latour‟s later position is not quite a skeptical position since a criterion 
for decision can always be hammered out if it is not ready to hand. That stance 
flirts with relativism in a more obvious way than Lab Life, since the early work 
emphasized the social production of facts about nature. But now distinctions 
between society and nature, persons and things have been abandoned, so the 
movement of Latour‟s early account is suddenly superficial rather than 
fundamental. Impishly, Latour admits that he once used the phrase “socially 
constructed” but adds, “I recanted immediately, since I meant something entirely 
different from what sociologists and their adversaries mean by social.”67 The 
extent of Latour‟s attempt to eschew almost all conceptual and analytical 
presuppositions is manifest in the abandonment of the term “fact” in favor of 
“factishes.” That utterly unforgivable neologism is the monstrous offspring of the 
hybridization of “fact” with “fetish.” Fetishism, we are told, is the accusation that 
“believers have projected onto a meaningless object their own beliefs and 
desires.” Facts are much like fetishes (so defined) because “they have a common 
element of fabrication.”68 If these claims are taken as—is with no further attempt 
at examination or interpretation, then it would appear that we are left with an 
uber-relativism in which everything is fabricated, even the means of fabrication. 
If that is the most plausible reading of Latour, then how could we even begin to 
take seriously his strange assertion that he is, “interested only in retracing our 
steps back to the moment when the very distinction between content and context 
has not yet been made”?69 With what tools, instruments, machines, devices or 
inference rules could we begin to do this work of retracing? If we make our 
analytical tools as we go along, as Latour surely intends us to do, then is it not 
probable that, after all that fabricating, it is those very tools that that have 
produced the mythical moment when and where social context and natural 
content have not yet been distinguished? 
But if Bruno Latour hasn‟t completely lost his mind, then there may be 
another Latour to salvage from regress, endless aporia and potential 
contradiction. Such a re-reading of Latour could return to Lab Life (1985 not 
1979) and put epistemological justification and techniques front and center and 
side by side. This reading would to a great extent gloss over the later 
archaeological expedition to discover the lost world without persons and things 
and nature and society. The re-reading would treat that excursion as just another 
quasi-mythical pragmatogony. Latour borrows this term from Michel Serres‟ 
Statues (1987), and it combines the Greek pragma (thing) and gonos (the 
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created). Latour reads Serres as saying that, “A pragmatogony is a slow 
movement that leads through a series of substitutions from a purely social and 
collective definition of the „thing‟ to a definition that requires more and more 
„objects‟ to hold it together. You start with a collective; you end with a collective 
plus a nature, plus a technique.”70 To be clear, the work of the pragmatogony, 
however frustratingly, hazy and ill-defined the notion may be, is not to offer 
another story about homo faber in which primitive humans fabricate the tools and 
other objects with which they build a social world that is supervenient on the 
natural world. Instead, a pragmatogony seems to tell a story about how things, 
human and non-human, came together in such a way that a specific, local 
technique became possible. Arguably, the story of TRH is a pragmatogony, since 
it is the far-from-definitive story of the way in which hypothalami, lab 
researchers, the Salk Institution, mass spectroscopes, research journals, the NSI 
and filtration gels collected together to constitute the fact of TRH. Later, Latour 
reflects, “all the interesting realities are no longer captured by the two extremes 
[nature and society], but are to be found in the substitution, cross-over, 
translations, through which actants shift their competences.”71 
Latour‟s larger pragmatogony of a primeval conceptual world (if you 
like, a conceptual Pangaea before its separation into the Gondwana of nature and 
the Laurasia of society) may be read as a kind of reductio, a demonstration of 
how unfathomable, alien and un-navigable the world is without the familiar 
techniques by which a semblance of order is secured. Throughout Latour‟s 
mature work, techniques continue to occupy a central place in his inquiry. For 
instance, he continues to talk about the “non-humans mixed into our collective 
life through laboratory practice.”72 He also argues that technique should be 
conceived in terms that are neither idealist nor materialist. Technique is 
characterized as more than an idealist projection of human beliefs and desires 
when Latour says, “techniques are not fetishes, they are unpredictable, not means 
but mediators, means and ends at the same time.”73 Further, technique is detached 
from materialism when Latour declares that, “in artifacts and technologies we do 
not find the efficacy and stubbornness of matter . . . it is full of engineers and 
chancellors and lawmakers, commingling their wills and their story lines with 
those of gravel, concrete paint, and standard calculations.”74 Elsewhere, Latour 
simply tells us that techniques are the liminal places where things like tools, 
instruments, machines, and molecules meet institutions, lab groups, economic 
scarcity and styles of reasoning. In the midst of any given technique, there is no 
clear demarcation between the social and the natural, the human and the non-
                                                     
70 Bruno Latour, “The Force and the Reason of Experiment,” in Homer E. Le Grand, ed., 
Experimental Inquiries: Historical, Philosophical and Social Studies of Experimentation in Science 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 74. 
71 Bruno Latour, “Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern! Steps Toward an Anthropology of Science,” 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21 (1990): 170-171. “Actant” is Latour‟s neutral 
monist term for human and non-human things. 
72 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 3. 
73 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 197. 
74 Latour, Pandora’s Hope,190. 
23 
 
human, since “we cannot separate forms of organization from technical 
practices.”75 Where and when human and non-human things (or things and non-
thing objects) come together in an efficacious technique, there is from that 
formation organization rather than mere noise or plasma. The emergence of that 
moment of organization, however it might be portrayed in a myth about its 
emergence, is indistinguishable from the technique. There is, in short, nothing 
hidden or cryptic beyond techniques that is to be discovered or decoded except 
endless myths and pragmatogonies about the ways in which those techniques 
began, just so. 
 
The Res-public of Latour 
  
Latour is not overly fond of Anglo-American philosophy of science, just as he is 
probably not overly fond of Californian wine. With jovial acidity he remarks, “If 
there is one thing that has made philosophy of science so lame, it is to have used 
mats and cats, mugs and dogs, in order to discover the right frame of mind to 
decide how we know with accuracy objects such as black holes and fossils, 
quarks and neutrinos.”76 He continues this thought in his debate with Harman 
with the remark, “Complicated objects” are interesting because “we cannot easily 
do for them what we do with hammers and with ordinary objects . . . science and 
technology are easier to study because they are a complication and novelty.”77 
This is not to deny that, say, the simple hammer will turn out to be a complicated 
object if it is given due attention. There are any number of hammers specially 
constructed to fit them to specific hammering tasks: framing hammers, 
geological hammers, ballpein hammers, brass hammers, sledgehammers, jack 
hammers and short-swing hammers. The list could go on. The nails driven by 
some of these hammers are similarly various, and while once they were 
completely specified by length, weight and price, they are now further articulated 
by ASTM F1667, the “Standard Specification for Driven Fasteners.” There might 
yet be a Latourian analysis of the hammer, but thus far, bigger meatier things, 
like TRH, mass transit systems and Pasteurization, have been attention-grabbing 
because they are the result of techniques that invoke so many dendritic 
connections between humans and things. 
Contra Russell and Wittgentstein, Latour does not hold that the world is 
made up of facts. For Latour, the world is very much made up of things. What 
those things are, and what those things can do, is neither mysterious nor obvious. 
There are facts about things to be learned, but those facts about things are made 
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not found. Laboratories are places where scientific facts are made. In labs, 
scientific facts are constructed which is to say that they are built-up with 
techniques and practices. Saying that facts are constructed or constituted need not 
entail anti-realism or skepticism about facts. Computers, teapots and nails are all 
constructed and they are all perfectly real. A fact‟s quality or state of being a 
fact—what is sometimes unhappily called its facticity—depends not on any 
specific configuration of matter and form, but on the techniques that sustain it. 
Thus, Guillemin and Schally did not receive a Nobel prize for their miraculous 
discovery of the fact of TRH. They did not, so to speak, discover TRH by 
painstakingly dusting away sand to reveal the hidden fact of TRH—they were, 
after all, endocrinologists not archeologists. They shared a Nobel for developing 
the array of techniques by which it is subsequently possible to state that it is a 
fact that “TRH is a tropic tripeptide hormone with the structure pyrtoGlu-His-
Pro-NH2.” Many of those techniques did not exist before the work of Guillemin 
and Schally, most involved the procurement equipment and reagents from 
laboratory supply companies, all involved highly trained laboratory personnel to 
deploy the equipment and produce the results, and at least one required 
convincing others of the surety of a new ratiocinative standard. The fact of TRH 
depends on the stability of all of these techniques that involve networks or 
associations among humans and things. To use a language that Latour later 
rejects, the stability of facts depends on relations among social institutions and 
arrangements, human-made things and things found in the world. In Latour‟s 
later glossy ANT language, facts are networks of human and non-human actants. 
In an infamous and oft-quoted passage from Lab Life, Latour rejects the Russell-
Wittgenstein view of facts and replaces it with an account that underscores the 
role of techniques: “Facts and artifacts do not correspond respectively to true and 
false statements. Rather, statements lie along a continuum according to the extent 
to which they refer to their conditions of construction. Up to a certain point on 
this continuum, the inclusion of reference to the conditions of its construction is 
necessary for the purposes of persuasion.” The point here is that the term “TRH” 
refers to a thing in the world, but it does not do so because there is any single 
principle of facticity that makes it refer. The fact of TRH is not ostensively 
established simply by pointing to a test-tube containing a few milligrams of 
barely visible stuff and saying, “There it is! That‟s TRH. It‟s pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-
NH2.” Nor is there much to be gleaned by asserting that “TRH is tropic tripeptide 
hormone with the structure pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2” is true if and only if TRH is 
tropic tripeptide hormone with the structure pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2.The trouble 
with the ostensive and disquotational accounts of facts, in Latour‟s view, is they 
mistake the relationship between facts and techniques. It is not that we accept 
only those techniques that generate true statements; rather, we take to be true 
those statements generated by the techniques we accept. Or, to express the same 
idea in a different way, both accounts tend attempt to explain why TRH is fact 
without mentioning how it became a fact. For Latour, this kind of separation of 
the context of justification (giving reasons why facts are true) and the context of 
discovery (how they were constructed in the first place) tends to hide the 
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justificatory work done by technique in laboratories and elsewhere. Many, and 
perhaps most, effective lab techniques are not truth-apt in the sense of involving 
formal, logical demonstrations. Rather they provide experimental demonstrations 
by manipulating things to produce consistent and regular phenomena. If lab 
technique is occluded from the context of justification, then what follows is the 
mistaken view that there is a gap between the world and language or mind that 
must be bridged by a philosophical theory of correspondence.78 
If we go to Wikipedia, or some other heir of Diderot, and lookup TRH, 
we will find a statement something like the following: “TRH is a tropic tripeptide 
hormone with the structure pyrtoGlu-His-Pro-NH2.” Before 1969, no 
encyclopedia included any such statement about TRH. Today no encyclopedia 
could claim to be complete without TRH. Of course, what appears in 
encyclopedias are statements about TRH, not TRH the thing itself. This is 
nothing more or less than the problem that beset early modern philosophy—an 
idea in the mind can resemble an external object in every respect except its 
existence. Various solutions to the problem have been proposed, none of them 
entirely satisfying. Since Frege, a widely accepted way of slipping around the 
problem has been to claim that existence is a property of properties not a property 
of things, and fortuitously, properties are always already concepts apprehensible 
by the mind. The Fregean solution comes at a high cost to common things and 
common sense. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Richard Rorty 
infamously declared the modern problem to be insoluble. Unlike Rorty, Latour 
does not think that philosophy has met its Kobayashi Maru, and unlike later-day 
Fregeans, Latour is unwilling to dispense with things in favor of facts. His 
philosophy of techniques keeps the world and statements, things and humans, 
bound together so the question of correspondence does not arise. Like Odysseus, 
Latour does not make his passage without a sacrifice. What Latour sacrifices to 
the sea-serpent in order to navigate his North-West passage is precisely 
Harman‟s brand of metaphysics. 
If there is a philosopher who likes things more than Bruno Latour, it is 
Graham Harman. Harman‟s world is populated by a blooming-buzzing confusion 
of things. Things burble through Harman‟s writing just like they cascade out of 
bulging closets in Don DeLillo‟s novels. There are “windmills, sunflowers, 
propane tanks, and Thailand” and “apples, vaccines, subway trains, and radio 
towers,” not to mention “chefs, biologists, aeronautical engineers and 
seducers.”79 And, of course, there are hammers. These things are known by virtue 
of their relations with us—their visible outline, taste, color, smell and what they 
do in our world. But these manifest relations are the surfaces of things, mere 
contact points with us and other things. For Harman, the pressing question of 
philosophy is how there are any contact points at all among things and between 
humans and things. The answer, claims Harman, is a thing has a hidden nature 
tucked away, deep down in itself, an inner reserve or reservoir that exceeds all 
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relations. Only this metaphysical reserve can explain the obvious fact that there 
are any relations at all. Latour is genuinely puzzled by Harman‟s position, though 
he is perfectly willing to acknowledge that, “causes, stones and facts never 
occupy the position of the thing-in-itself.”80 Latour says there has never been a 
philosopher who thinks there is nothing to things beyond relations. Even Hume, 
continues Latour, thinks there is something beyond relations; he just does not 
know how to get there with the philosophical tools available to him. Whereas 
Harman claims that the fact of relations shows there must be something beyond 
relations, Latour observes that such a beyond is inaccessible. Things may well be 
more than their manifest qualities, but they are only known to us by way of 
relations. In a similar fashion, the great experimental philosopher Lavoisier 
replied to a different kind of metaphysician many years ago: “If, by the term 
elements, we mean to express those simple and indivisible atoms of which matter 
is composed, it is extremely probable that we know nothing at all about them.”81 
Following Serres at arms-length, Latour does not deny the possibility of 
things having essences beyond relations, but this “beyond” is not first 
philosophy. The beyond is part of the mythical, poetic and narrative background 
that is continually drawn upon to reshape established techniques, and to motivate 
that reshaping. This kind of metaphysics is loved only for its “practical 
consequences.” Such a metaphysics is not explanatory but inspirational. It is 
retained for its ability to take inquiry in new and surprising directions, as James 
Lovelock did when he asked whether the Earth is an organism that maintains 
homeostasis and drew on the myth of Gaia to inform his answer.82 Thus, while 
Harman and Latour both offer a philosophy of ordinary objects that is a 
materialist philosophy without materialism, ANT and OOP have very different 
relations with their respective metaphysics. If ANT has a metaphysics at all, it is 
a weak metaphysics with a post-Humean flavor. There is no science of being qua 
being, and in its stead is only an anthropology of the techniques by which 
persons and things are collectively articulated. The metaphysical work, such as it 
is, is the anthropological work of giving a description of the processes by which 
specific categories of being came into view, and on occasion, passed away. In 
other words, Latour‟s thing philosophy is a philosophy of techniques that leads to 
an ontology without metaphysics. If pressed to give a further account of the 
origin of things, the Latourian has little recourse but to offer a mytho-poetic 
pragmatogony. If pressed to give a further account of the origin of techniques 
beyond an anthropological description, the Latourian has little recourse but to 
say, “This is simply what I do.” 
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